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Review of »An Inquiry into Modes of Existence.
An Anthropology of the Moderns« by Bruno Latour
Summary
L’ latest study of themoderns is a continuation of a life-
long project. Just like We Have Never Been Modern, it’s mainly
a theoretical work in which sociology, anthropology and phi-
losophy are coming together1. e starting point is the same:
“emoderns have never been modern, but they have believed
they are modern”2. ere are many similarities with his pre-
vious works, although his modes of existence are a huge step
in the network ontology. For many years he aacked the on-
tological foundations of traditional sociology. Now, L
finally gives an example of how his idea of an ontological plu-
ralism, the network metaphor and empiricism come together.
e result is a multiplicity of various modes of existence, each
with their own characteristics and epistemology. In this crit-
ical review, we will focus on a few recurring topics. We will
start by seing the stage for L’ modes of existence and
their keys, anti-fundamentalism and the network metaphor.
As a result, we come across a confusing alternation between
a descriptive and a normative style. Next, there will be a criti-
cal examination of his “moderns” and the new concept Double
1 L, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 7.
2 Ibid. p. 14.
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Click. Finally, we discuss an unusual use of the age-old idea of
transcendence.
Before we go further into the listed topics, it seems only fair
to refer to the official website of the book.3 In my opinion,
it stands out among other websites dedicated to philosophy
books for the quality of its design and it’s knowledge of the
subject.
1. Empirical metaphysics and ontological pluralism
At the last two pages of the book, the reader finds a list of the fieen
modes of existence L detected in the world of the moderns: fic-
tion, religion, law, politics, etc. ey all have their own way of being.
eir goal, inner workings and epistemology are all unique.4 Repeat-
ing these modes and L’ findings would be redundant. Yet, it
is interesting how he came up with these fieen modes. To under-
stand his, what we might call, empirical metaphysics, we are forced
to make a small detour through the starting point of metaphysics as
a pre-empirical speculation on reality.
Metaphysics as the study of the ultimate structure of reality has
traditionally been a rationalist enterprise. D’ first medita-
tion inMéditationsMétaphysiques5 is an analytical way of turning into
oneself. Central in his legendary work is his epistemological doubt,
enforced by bothGod and an evil demon. K on the other hand asks
the question: how is reality organized in such a way that it makes
itself understandable to us? H starts a phenomenological
research of being in which he clearly denounces the so-called vul-
gar phenomena.6 All of these traditional ways of approaching meta-
physics are pre-empirical or try to constantly overcome the everyday
life empiricism.
3 L, Immanence.
4 L, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, p. 18.
5 D, Méditations métaphysiques.
6 H, Zijn en Tijd, p. 58-63.
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In L’ work, everything starts with empirical data. Episte-
mological skepticism can’t be a reason to make metaphysics a pre-
empirical enterprise, since there is already a metaphysical assump-
tion in this epistemological skepticism. Not going into any details,
we might bluntly summarize epistemological skepticism as a gap be-
tween the looking-subject and the playing-for-dead-object. e same
subject/object distinction is implicitly present in the metaphysical
search for how reality has to be in order to make it perceivable to
us. L elsewhere mocks K:
One should add the comical role of being-there-just-to-prove-
that-one-is-not-an-idealist role invented by Kant […] things
are there but play no role except that of mute guardians hold-
ing the sign. We deny that we deny the existence of an outside
reality. ite a function well worth hapless “things in them-
selves”.7
We can’t translate L’ works in one sentence, but his at-
tack on the subject/object dualism is definitely the key throughout his
thinking. is dualism is the weak point towards which L sent
wave aer wave of aacks. D produces the subject by med-
itating. L prefers to produce a different metaphysics, not based
on meditation, but on experience in everyday life. Unlike H,
we shouldn’t start by studying the questioners of the ontological ques-
tion in order to obtain the metaphysical questions.8 It’s the anthro-
pological study of reality that will automatically include humans. In
this way, a kind off naive-looking empiricism is far less problematic
as a starting point than juggling with heavy metaphysical concepts
without any eyes and hands.
What is le is a vague idea of following whatever we encounter.
emetaphysician becomes an anthropologist, a switch L clev-
erly made as well while jumping from the title An Inquiry into Modes
of Existence to the subtitle An Anthropology of the Moderns. e net-
7 L, e promises of constructivism, p. 32.
8 K, Martin Heidegger , p. 23.
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work metaphor is a way to describe the result of the act of following.9
Riding piggyback on an actor is like tracking down the paths it takes.
It’s up to the researcher to detect clusters of actors.10
is leaves us at a post-humanist position in the sense that hu-
mans aren’t the starting-point, goal or a necessary intermediate. From
here, others in the ANT family like A. M11 and J. L12 have put
forward the idea of chaotic performative realities. Besides the simi-
larities, L has taken a slightly different path. In this new book,
the modes of existences aren’t to be understood as clusters of actors,
but rather interpretative keys.
To understand this network metaphor as the anthropologi-
cal/empirical work that needs to be done in order to come up with the
metaphysical structure; we need to stop once again. Remember, there
is no reason to accept any assumptions at this point. is includes the
distinction between real and unreal, truth and falsity. Before we delve
into the network metaphor, there are two simple, yet, massively im-
portant rules: (1) Everything we encounter is a part of reality13, and,
(2) existence is an action and every action implies a relation.14
2. Categories/modes: Not just networks with knots
With all of this in mind, we can finally see why L considers
himself an anthropologist and at the same time writes about modes
9 Network is not merely used as a way to make the work of the researcher plastic.
In a second meaning, L sees existence as such to be based on relations. In this
way, an existant, actor and network are all synonyms.
10 L’ popular term „actant” is oen used in his previous book as a part
of his object/subject independent vocabulary. e actant was a replacement for the
anthropomorphic actor. For some reason it has, aer many years of good service,
le L’ last book.
11 M, e Body Multiple, pp. 54, 96 and 115.
12 L, ANT and politics: working in and on the world.
13 L, When things strike back, p. 109. In various sources we can find
L’ criticism of so-called fetishes.
14 “is point is not relativist: all statements are not equal. It is relationist: show-
ing the relationships between the points of view held by mobilized and by mobilizing
actors gives judgements as fine a degree of precision as one could wish for” (L,
Technology is Society Made Durable, p. 128).
Review of »An Inquiry into Modes of Existence« 137
of existence in a serious, metaphysical way. One should keep in mind
that themetaphysical project of Lwas from the very start a nec-
essary detour in the creation of a proper sociological methodology.
With Ian H’ terminology, we might distinguish the historical
epistemology of S and S15, the historical ontology of
H16 and lastly ontology as a philosophical discipline, neces-
sary to reach a methodology that includes a historical epistemology
and ontology. In this book, he follows the moderns (a problematic
term, as we will see later) and uncovers their implicit metaphysics.
Reality is always in-the-making. Because of this, L isn’t forced
to search absolute and universal structures of reality, although the
modes of existence are structures of reality nevertheless. ere might
be differences in the structures of reality between for example Abo-
riginals and the moderns. Acknowledging his limits, he follows the
moderns and finds a network. New to this book is the view that link-
ages between the different entities aren’t enough. One entity can be
read in a completely different way through the glasses of the mode.
e major problem with the reading and glasses metaphor we’ve
only just used is its anthropocentric character. Crucial in this story is
that we can’t speak of subjects reading an object-out-there in a reli-
gious or political way. Interpretation is key, yet, there are no sub-
jects to interpret. Taking this to the metaphysical level we might
come up with Graham H’ work in which every entity comes
across another one, interprets it, but never really grasp it in its to-
tality. H doesn’t have an empirical metaphysics like L
and the laer would disagree with the subterranean creatures.17 For
L, entities are only their relations. What the two do have in
common is their search to write about interpreting entities in a broad,
post-humanist, way.
All the modes of existence (or “categories” ) have their own actors,
goals, epistemology, etc. Here L sees the moderns stumbling
over their own feet. ey oen don’t respect their own categories.
15 S & S, e Leviathan and the Air-Pump.
16 H, Historical ontology.
17 H, Tool-Being, p. 133.
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Namely, he sees how science has upgraded itself to be the supreme
category. In debunking certain facts belonging to other categories,
they used the wrong tools to interpret the fact and verify its validity.
He sees this as an unacceptable evolution. None of the modes can
dominate all the others.18 Every category has its own key. Knowing
in what category you’re working in is essential in choosing the right
key. is choosing is itself a category, named preposition.19
e new idea of modes with their own key for interpretation
makes L vulnerable for problems he managed to avoid while he
only had networks to worry about. Firstly, L had to fight a lot
of accusations of relativism in the past.20 Within his theory he was
able to avoid these. Differences in conceptions of truth were simply
the result of a different composition of links between actors. ere
were no transcendent categories with their own specific rules, only
entangled links that created knots and unique situations out of which
rules sprang.
Networks could have knots with their own inner workings, but
there was nothing platonic or transcendent about them. Modes on
the other hand seem much harder to uphold on a plain metaphysical
level. e mode is an interpretative key, but doesn’t originate from
an anthropological study of the links and knots of the network. It’s
unclear where the modes come from and they show a remarkable re-
semblance with our ordinary conceptions of spheres in reality. By
making them distinct metaphysical categories and warning against
so-called categorical mistakes, it’s hard to see how this pluralistic so-
cial ontology isn’t relativism. Distinct modes with their seemingly
transcendental state own their own sense of truth and are protected
against other modes.
Secondly, we seem to be able to categorize different modes of ex-
istence, something that L doesn’t do. Connected to this, the
oen used network has taken up new functions. For many years,
L was active as an Actor-Network eory scholar next to aca-
18 L, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, p. 316.
19 Ibid. p. 57.
20 L, Pandora’s Hope.
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demics like Michel C and John L. e addition of a key for
every category is considered by L a (lile) break with ANT.
e network metaphor has become a mode of existence next to all the
other ones.21 Yet, the different modes of existence have very different
functions. For example, preposition and double click are (possibly)
present in modes like religion, law and economics, while these lat-
ter modes cannot operate within preposition and double click. In our
opinion, the laer modes; religion, law and economics, should be con-
sidered knots in the network. Unfortunately, L doesn’t spend
much aention in categorizing his different modes. e preposition
is knowing in what knot you’re working at that moment. In this way,
the network itself, in my view, can’t be a mode of existence like any
of these two. e network is merely a visualization of the whole of
reality.
When we return to L’ criticism of ANT, we acknowledge
its relevance even without the network as a mode of existence. With-
out a key, ANTers followed the actors successfully, but they couldn’t
really understand them. e homogeneity of networks can be broken,
not by adding categories like L seems to have done now, but by
bumping into knots in the network. It would certainly be ridiculous
to approach a church sermon similarly to the technical aspects of the
microphone through which the sermon finds its way to the ears of the
interested. But isn’t L one of the ANT scholars who, referring
to Gabriel T, draws the focus to connections? You don’t need
a theologian to understand the technical aspects of the microphone.
e laer is more connected with the electricity company, Chinese
factories and a long list of innovative engineers. A single connec-
tion with the Holy Word won’t be enough to make a complex knot
in which both highly define each other and a common epistemology
would spring. erefore, the physical presence of a microphone in
a church doesn’t make them part of the same knot. Networks in ANT
have never been solely based on either space or time. It’s through
the anthropological study that we come across these modes of exis-
21 L, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, p. 64.
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tence, each with their own interpretative key. We should beware of
the seemingly transcendental move L makes.
Making room for other categories/modes is L’ main incen-
tive for writing this book.22 As a Catholic theologian, it’s not surpris-
ing to see his efforts in the creation of a space within reality for reli-
gion. By demanding respect for the ways of being of every mode of
existence, he in fact rejects any scientific objection towards religious
claims, although we should add that he equally condemns religious
claims about scientific objects. e ghost of relativism has returned
together with the addition of the categories.
3. Confusion: Descriptive or normative?
e main issue we have in reading L’ anthropology of the
moderns is a tension between the descriptive and normative aspect.
In his view, all the described modes are part of reality in the modern
world. At the same time, there is always something normative in there
aswell. If reality is something done, it seems contradictory for L
to make remarks on how the moderns are doing it wrong. When ev-
ery mode of existence has its own epistemology and ethics, who is
L to decide in all of this? Isn’t he making a so-called Cate-
gory Mistake or granting himself a meta-mode? e answer might lie
within his own theory. e upside of a reality in the making is its pos-
sibility to change, nomaer how difficult it is at the moment. Philoso-
phers have hitherto only interpreted the world in various ways, now
L’ interpretation is itself an action for change. Academics as
creative actors in a political-ethical project.
L’ goal is to explain how reality is today in the modern
world and what changes he deems fit. e most remarkable example
here is religion. For many years, L studied laboratories and the
workings of scientists in general. In this book, he finally recognizes
the time to be ripe to exploit the space he created himself during the
past thirty years. e details of religion as a mode of existence can
be read in the book. What is difficult to find, is the reason why we
22 L, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, pp. 72, 141.
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should accept the boundaries between the categories. Whenever sci-
entists are debunking a religious claim, L denounces this de-
bunking because they don’t understand what religion is for. Simply
put, the key of science is different from the religious key. He calls
this a “category mistake”. In opposition to a mistake of the senses,
it’s not a maer of improving your equipment, moving a bit closer
or working harder. An application of a key from one mode of ex-
istence would be to read and judge beings in another mode of exis-
tence.23 is position itself is defendable. emain issue for us is how
L describes themodes of existence and later disagrees with how
the creators, ie. the moderns, function within this reality. e cate-
gory mistakes are a value judgment based on a meta-epistemological
rule. Namely, don’t mix the modes and keys.
With Ian H’ terminology we might call L’ anthro-
pology of the moderns a contemporary historical ontology. L
writes about the contemporary social ontologies and becomes an ac-
tor in the creation of his own topic of research. e book becomes
a political-ethical project. Limiting oneself to the description would
be an academic fortification of the existing ontological categories. An-
drzej W. N pleas in this respect through his imagined ontologies
for a progressive program.24 It’s the acknowledgment of the agency
of the researcher and an awareness of the political-ethical position
taken. At the same time, both L and N, are constructive
and positive in their study. Seeing the ontological categories as so-
cially constructed doesn’t make them unreal and definitely doesn’t
destroy them. Only through creation (by imagination) the ruling cat-
egories can be replaced.25
InL’ metaphysical views, reality is constantly in the mak-
ing. More than ever before, this book tries to become a serious actor
in this creative process. His descriptive anthropology of the mod-
erns is accompanied by his own agenda. In effect, he pleads for the
23 Ibid. p. 50-51.
24 N, Ontological Imagination.
25 “Slechts door te scheppen kunnen wij vernietigen!” — “Only through creation,
we can destroy!” (N, De vrolijke wetenschap, p. 81-82.
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re-institutionalization of the different categories. e combination of
both the descriptive and the normative aspects make this book a bit
sneaky.
4. The moderns
Notwithstanding the meticulous aention for ontological assump-
tions in sociology, there is a remarkable naivety in the use of “the
moderns” by L. e problem with the moderns, according to
L, is the gap between their definitions or theory and their prac-
tices. ere seems to be a similar problem in L’ use of “mod-
erns”. But while L applauds the moderns in their practices and
denounces their metaphysical theories, we will do the opposite with
L.
Referring to We Have Never Been Modern, L writes:
e “we” of the somewhat grandiloquent title did not desig-
nate a specific people or a particular geography, but rather all
those who expect Science to keep a radical distance from pol-
itics. All those people, no maer where they were born, who
feel themselves pushed by time’s arrow in such a way that be-
hind them lies an archaic past unhappily combining Facts and
Values, and before them lies a more or less radiant future in
which the distinction between Facts and Values will finally be
sharp and clear.26
L explicitly defines the moderns not in terms of geography.
Instead, it’s the function of Science as a supreme judge and mode of
existence that is under aack. It’s Science with a capital “S” because
it is an all-encompassing, absolute and a fixed category with strong
beliefs about Truth and progress. Science as studied by L and
many others in the Studies of Science and Technology is, according
to L, different in that it’s one mode of existence. Here science
loses its capital “s” because its existence and content are constantly in
the making and don’t automatically encompass the whole of reality.
26 L, We Have Never Been Modern, p. 8.
Review of »An Inquiry into Modes of Existence« 143
Unfortunately, whenwe accept this definition, L himself of-
ten miss-uses “moderns”. Already in the introduction he jumps from
“moderns” to “the West” and “Europe”27 as if they were synonyms.
Yet, no one can accept the complete absence of geography in “Eu-
rope”. erefore, L violates in his use of the word “modern” his
own definition of it. e problem rises whenever L moves from
an abstract to a political argument.28 Even when we accept for a mo-
ment the equalization of modern and European and ignore the geo-
graphical aspect, the political views on Europe are quite improvident.
Is there any political scientist who considers Europeans as one group
with a single set of beliefs? Differences in religion, politics, and social
and economic status are all neglected. A bizarre move for someone
who claims to be more empirical than empiricists and more materi-
alist than materialists.29 We might assume that a thorough study of
politics will come up with a knot of Europe, similar to the studies
made of science by L, but L himself so far hasn’t begun
such a study and writes about politics in a rough and idealistic way.
In multiple reviews of We Have Never Been Modern, many already
problematized the vagueness of “the moderns”.30 Reading this book, it
doesn’t look like L has listened to those critics. e importance
of the moderns plays less in the metaphysical argument explained
at the start of this article. But L does claim a political project
as well. In this context, the conflicting usage of “moderns” is prob-
lematic. e moderns are functioning like the bourgeoisie in Roland
B’ oeuvre. ey are the ill-defined and overtly stupid straw
men. Like the Walkers, they are destructive in their behavior, yet, we
almost feel sorry for them because of their brainless behavior. Hope-
fully political scientists will work in a more L manner than
L.
27 Ibid. p. 16.
28 Although even in his metaphysical argument he has used the phrase “European
ontology” (L, Reflections on Etienne Souriau’s).
29 L, Can We Get Our Materialism. Materialism in the sense of actors we
encounter (whether it are humans, microscopes or bacteria), without the postulation
of a transcendent entity “maer”.
30 E, Living Dangerously, p. 4.
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5. Double Click: The moderns’ cheating trick
Double Click (DC) is one of the modes of existence. Unlike the previ-
ouslymentionedmodes, we can’t think of DC as a knot in the network
of reality. DC is a way of operating within the categories. It reduces
existence into information as an unmediated and thus untransformed
being on its own, moving around freely. Criticism of such shortcuts
has been present in L’ works from day one. e idea of ir-
reducibility is already a key element in the second part of e Pas-
teurization of France31 and has been repeated in more understandable
words later on.32 is is a philosophical stance connected to other
contemporary thinkers like the flat ontology of L.R. B.33 In An
Inquiry into Modes of Existence he shows how DC is used in a range
of different modes of existence. e concept is new, but the idea has
been in L’ work for a while. It’s the highway the moderns use
without ever having to build and maintain the road and vehicles on
it.
Referring to D, L writes about DC as the Evil Ge-
nius. It’s a way to jump from the searching subject to the object-out-
there. In D’ case, the means to get information (the senses)
have already been cut off by the axe of skepticism. For L on
the other hand, DC is a means to get information, while ignoring all
the necessary mediators.34 Using DC has the upside of moving very
fast. e downside is that moderns consider information and facts
as independent pieces of the universal Truth. e result is an abso-
lutist or fundamentalist view on reality in which there is no room for
the multiplicity of modes. In order to gain access to this Truth, the
moderns must find means to transport the world-out-there into their
books of knowledge without any transformation. In particular, aca-
demics within the Studies of Science and Technology (SST) have been
vehemently aacked by scientists and other philosophers for degrad-
ing scientific facts to merely social constructions. Yet, all they did
31 L, e Pasteurization, p. 151-236.
32 L, Comments on »e Sociology of Knowledge about Child Abuse«, p. 67.
33 B, e Democracy of Objects, p. 67.
34 L, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, p. 93.
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was describe what is happening inside and around laboratories, an
act unrightfully interpreted as an aack on objectivity35 In L’
words, they showed the mediators the path from the Amazon forest
to the academic paper.36 Nobody can claim the Amazon forest and
an academic paper are the same, only a series of transformations can
take you from one to the other.
Generally, L prefers aacking straw men. By postulating
DC as a vile tool of the moderns, he ignores some of the relevant com-
ments made during the science wars. e straw man mister Modern
is as a dummy always an easy target. L seems to avoid a di-
rect encounter by neglecting footnotes, a bad habit he has for years.
Maybe he sees them as an unnecessary rhetoric devise, building im-
penetrable walls around the text.37 To us, the opposite is the case.
For example, when we take a look at the criticism of Jean B
and Alan S38, they don’t always disagree with the correctness
of the descriptive studies made in the SST. ey simply don’t under-
standwhywe should observe what scientists are doing in such a banal
fashion. What L has called DC here isn’t accepted by anybody.
S, B and everybody else knows we don’t jump from the
Amazon forest straight to an academic paper. It isn’t the work of the
scientists that is denied, but it is the interpretation and metaphysical
consequences of this work that were at stake in the science wars.
e question is whether knowledge is the result of an archaeo-
logical inquiry in which the eternal Truth underneath was discov-
ered or the transformation of and by different actors into a new one?
e same goes for the DC L finds in economics. e shop
clerk and his costumer are probably (vaguely) aware of all the insti-
tutions needed in order to keep transactions running smoothly. Just
like studying science, the economist might ask: why should we study
these mundane things? Maybe, at least in this specific case, we truly
35 Ibid. p. 154.
36 L, Pandora’s Hope, p. 24-79.
37 L, Science in Action, p. 56-61.
38 S & B, Intellectueel bedrog, p. 112.
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have never been modern! In our view, the fundamentalism of Truth
maligned by L doesn’t have DC as a necessary consequence.
6. Continuity/immanence and discontinuity/transcendence
e classical distinction between immanence and transcendence is
largely thrown overboard in An Inquiry into Modes of Existence. is
classical transcendence is called “the bad transcendence” by L.39
ese are the absolutes and universals that he has been fighting for
ever, as noted before. e immanence and transcendence used by
L is different from the classical views and isn’t necessary reli-
gious. e question is not whether God is in or beyond our world,
let alone a K search for the conditions to make experiences
possible. L highjacks the words to address the problem of ex-
istence.40 Continuity and immanence are synonyms, idem dio for
discontinuity and (small) transcendence.
It’s unclear to us why L uses such an important concept in
the history of philosophy like transcendence, especially as the mean-
ing of transcendence doesn’t show any correspondence with previous
meanings. Even L himself acknowledges that small transcen-
dence is merely a part of immanence. On the website we read:
Immanence, for AIME [An Inquiry into Modes of Existence], is
synonymous with good [or lile] transcendence, that which
identifies hiatuses and the passages necessary for the prolon-
gation of courses of action.41
e oen used network metaphor and the idea of reality in the
making seem a far beer fit in explaining the same idea. e mean-
ing is so different from the traditional use of transcendence that we
can’t even see it as a kind of monster D claimed to make.42 e
incredibly interesting changes L made in the meaning of social
39 L, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, p. 277.
40 We would add „through time”, but this would imply a simplistic view of time as
a straight arrow forward.
41 L, Immanence.
42 D, Leer to a Harsh Critic, p. 6.
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constructivism (a concept he, unfortunately, has dropped a while ago)
during the past decades, while keeping the original social construc-
tivism (at least for a while) makes sense. To summarize, “social” isn’t
a kind of stuff, instead it indicates a set of relations between actors.
“Constructivism” shows how every actor is made out of many differ-
ent actors.43 For example, a building is constructed in a collaboration
(social) of many different actors: architect, bricks, pencils, masons…
But the small leaps an actor has to take in order to subsist aren’t tran-
scending anything. Within the network metaphor there simply isn’t
any transcendental position possible, a fact L happily agrees
with, while he confusingly uses the word anyway.
7. Conclusion
L’ latest book fits well within the long list of works he pub-
lished since Laboratory Life in 1979.44 As a philosophical system
builder he has been working on a pluralistic and empirical meta-
physics for a while. New concepts like Double Click fit well within his
already developed thought. Unfortunately, together with “the mod-
erns”, the same DC served in this review as an example of a defect in
all of L’ works. It’s a shame he uses far too oen weak straw
men instead of actual opponents. It’s hard to predict what the result
would be in a direct confrontation. In our opinion, L will be
able to keep his metaphysical project. But he might be surprised in
how similar the outcome will be once the metaphysical foundation of
the humanities is changed.
An Inquiry into Modes of Existence gives us a description of the
modes of the moderns and hints at how L would like them to
function. Researchers can use the various works of ANT scholars like
Michel C, John L and Bruno L with all their method-
ological tools in order to study certain topics. e normative aspect
L adds in this work is quite new compared to his previousworks
and those of other ANT’ers. Nevertheless, we do think that the recog-
43 L, A Relativistic Account.
44 L & W, Laboratory Life.
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nition of a political-ethical project will grow importance in the future
through the work of L, N and others.
Ultimately, this book does present something new. It’s the ap-
plication of a theory L has been working on for decades. e
addition of modes has changed quite a lot. But it’s hard to see what
the role of his denigrated networks will be, how he will remain an
empirical anthropologist and whether he can hold off relativism.
Anowledgment for proofreading and correcting goes to David
O’Donnell.
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